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NOTES AND COMMENTS
obligation upon defendant, it is a factor in determining defendant's
negligence in an alleged breach or omission of such duty.8 . Since per-
sons at public railroad crossings are not trespassers, 9 the railroad owes
more than a duty not to willfully or wantonly injure them; it must ex-
ercise due care for their safety.10
Assuming that in the Stratton case plaintiff was negligent in climb-
ing between the cars, it seems that the doctrine of last clear chance1
might have been applied since defendant, in view of the long standing
custom, owed a duty to warn plaintiff before starting the train. In
North Carolina, it is not essential that defendant have actual knowledge
of the danger to plaintiff, if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the peril
could have been discovered.
12
EDWIN B. HATCH, JR.
Parole-Gain Time Credits Forfeited Upon Revocation
In a recent habeas corpus proceeding in Florida, the petitioner sought
release from confinement on the theory that his sentence had expired.
At an earlier date he had been released on parole, and upon violation of
the conditions of his parole he had been returned to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. He now contended that his sentence
had been served, by computing for credit, in addition to the time actually
served in prison, (1) the period he was at large on parole, and (2)
gain time for good conduct granted prior to date of parole. Held, in
reversing the trial court which granted the petition, neither the time
spent on parole nor the gain time for good conduct granted prior to
parole serve to reduce the time imposed by the original sentence.'
S. E. 1066, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 988 (1911) (custom of sounding gong as warning
to persons between gates on railroad track before lowering gates).
Cf. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F. 2d 816 (4th
Cir. 1950), where evidence of custom was held for determination of the jury only
where there is other evidence from which jury could properly conclude that de-
fendant used ordinary care.
'Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 200 N. C. 543, 158 S. E. 75, cert. denied, 284 U. S.
636 (1931) ; STAxSBURY, NORTH: CAROLINA EviDmNc- §95 (1946).
'"Where a railroad track crosses a public highway, both a traveler and the
railroad have equal rights to cross. . . ." Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 163
N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913). Missouri ex rel. Bush v. Sturgis, 281 Mo. 598,
221 S. W. 91 (1920).
10 Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913). "A
railroad company which blocks a crossing .. . for a longer time than the law
permits has been held to become itself a trespasser, and to be estopped to say that
one who attempts to climb over its cars is a trespasser... ." 44 Am. JUR. 743-744
(1942).1 Bogan v. Carolina Central R. R., 129 N. C. 154, 39 S. E. 808 (1901).
" Mount Olive Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 233 N. C. 661, 65 S. E.
2d 379 (1951); Aydlett v. Keim, 232 N. C. 367, 61 S. E. 2d 109 (1950); Ingram
v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N. C. 444, 35 S. E. 2d 337 (1945); West
Coust. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 185 N. C. 43, 116 S. E. 3 (1923) ; Ray v.
Aberdeen & R. R. R., 141 N. C. 84, 53 S. E. 622 (1906).
'Mayo v. Lukers, 53 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1951).
1952]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A Florida statute specifically provided that in event of revocation
of parole, time spent at large on parole "would in no manner decrease
or diminish the time imposed by the original sentence. ' 2 Hence, the
ruling of the court on this point seems clearly correct. However, there
was no express statutory provision dealing with the status of gain time
for good conduct earned prior to parole. The court cited a statute pro-
viding for forfeiture of gain time credits in the case of certain serious
misconduct of those actually in prison,3 but the statute clearly was not
applicable, as was apparently recognized, to misconduct of parolees.
However, it was reasoned from this statute that since the gain time
allowance may be forfeited by misconduct during the life of the sentence,
that "the time allowance is an act of grace rather than a vested right
which may be withdrawn, modified or denied. ... "4 Hence, the ad-
ministrative agency (the Florida Paroles Commission) had the authority
to disallow these previously earned credits upon revocation of parole.
An earlier Florida case, not cited in the principal case, had reached the
same result. 5 However, in neither of these cases did the court expressly
deal with what seems to be an important question; i.e., should an ad-
ministrative agency have the authority in the absence of an express
legislative grant to disallow gain time credits previously earned, upon
revocation of parole? Although the granting of gain time credits may
be labelled an "act of grace," it is nevertheless an act of legislative grace.
It could thus be reasoned that the Florida legislature had apparently
intended that a prisoner should be deprived of that "grace" only when
authorized by express statutory provision. On this basis, it would seem
that the decision of the Florida court upholding the "administrative for-
feiture" of gain time credits is not well-founded. 6
Parole statutes may be generally classified into three categories:
First, those that expressly provide that upon revocation of parole, all
gain time credits shall be forfeited.' Second, those that provide, in
'FLA. STAT. ANN. §947.21 (1940). The similar statute in North Carolina is
N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-61.1 (Supp. 1951).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. §954.04 (1940). This statute provides that all commuta-
tions which shall have accrued in favor of the prisoner shall be forfeited for each
sustained charge of escape or attempted escape, mutinous conduct or other serious
misconduct.
"Mayo v. Lukers, 53 So. 2d 916,917 (Fla. 1951).
'Dear v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 164, 14 So. 2d 267 (1943).
'Apparently the court is of the opinion that a result is automatically derived
by placing a label on the gain time credits. Whether gain time credits are, or
are not, "vested rights," is irrelevant. If the test of "vested" is "the certainty of
the future right of enjoyment," clearly they are not "vested rights" for a statute
specifically provides for forfeiture under certain circumstances. Even if they
could be labelled vested rights," they may be divested by legislative authority, as
indicated by statutes, note 7 infra. Therefore, the Florida court would not seem
to be justified in concluding that the gain time credits may be disallowed simply
because they are not "vested rights," but instead are "acts of grace."
' COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48 §§549, 557 (1935) ; DEL. REv. CODE c. 101, 4155 §38
(1935) ; LA. REv. STAT. §15:574.9 (West 1950) ; ME. REV. STAT. C. 136 §22 (1944);
OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 §332.14 (1949); Wis. STAT. §57.11 (3) (1947).
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effect, that forfeiture of gain time credits shall lie in the discretion of
the administrative agency responsible for parole matters.8 Third, those
statutes which do not expressly deal with the status of gain time credits
upon revocation of parole.9
Jurisdictions in the third category are split as to the status of gain
time credits on revocation of parole. Where one statute provided that
upon revocation of parole the prisoner may be required to "serve in
prison the whole or any part of the maximum period for which at the
time of his release, he was subject to imprisonment under his sentence
... -,10 it was held that emphasis was to be placed on the words, "at
the time of his release" 11 on parole; i.e., that the exact status of his
8CAL. GEN. STAT. c. 429 §883 (1949); N. Y. CORRECTION LAW §218; UTAIH
CODE ANN. §85-9-78 (1943) ; 18 U. S. C. §4165 (1948). Courts would not review
the action of the particular agency unless it clearly appears that it has exceeded its
powers or that substantial injustice has been done. See People ex rel. Thread-
craft v. Brophy, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 75, 255 App. Div. 823 (1938) ; Ex Parte Taylor,
216 Cal. 274, 13 P. 2d 906 (1932). But cf. People ex rel. Fershing v. Wilson, 20
N. Y. S. 2d 895, 174 Misc. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1939), reversed, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 897,
259 App. Div. 957 (3d Dep't 1939). Federal courts construe 18 U. S. C. §4165,
which provides for discretionary forfeiture of gain time for good conduct for vio-
lation of the rules of the institution, as being applicable to forfeiture upon revoca-
tion of parole. Such construction rests on the theory that while on parole a parolee
is "still in contemplation of law a prisoner, his parole privilege being merely an
extension of the prison walls. Jarman v. U. S., 92 F. 2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1937).
Federal cases seem to indicate that forfeiture is an almost automatic procedure
upon revocation of parole. See Hedrick v. Steele, 187 F. 2d 261 (8th Cir. 1951) ;
Taylor v. Squier, 142 F. 2d 737 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Sanford v. Runyon, 136 F. 2d 54
(5th Cir. 1943) ; Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F. 2d 40 (10th Cir. 1937) ; Phipps v.
Pescor, 68 F. Supp. 242 (W. D. Mo. 1946). WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §10249-4
(Supp. 1940) allows the discretionary imposition, as a condition of parole, that
credits shall be forfeited upon violation of parole.
' Some provide that the prisoner shall be remanded and confined for the unex-
pired term of his sentence, which is calculated from the date of delinquency: ALA.
CODE ANN. tit. 42 §12 (1940) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38 §808 (1949) ; IND. STAT.
ANN. §13-249, et seq. (Burns 1933) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 127 §149 (1949) ; MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §28.1316 (1938); N. M. STAT. ANN. §42-1709 (1941); OHio GEN.
CODE ANN. §2209-20 (Supp. 1950) (however, parolee may be re-paroled on dif-
ferent conditions, or sent to another institution); TENN. CODE ANN. §11843.12
(Supp. 1951). Others provide that the prisoner shall be 'remanded and confined
for the unexpired term of his sentence, which is calculated from the date of re-
lease on parole: ARiz. CODE ANN. §47-116 (1939); FLA. STAT. ANN. §947.21
(1940); GA. CODE ANN. §77-505 (1937) (discretionary whether time on parole
shall be included as part of the original sentence) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAwS art.
41, §84 (1939) (discretionary whether time on parole shall be included as part of
the original sentence); Mo. REv. STAT. §§4202, 9160 (1939); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§148.61.1 (Supp. 1951); N. H. Ray. LAWS c. 429, §36 (1942); N. J. STAT. ANN.
§2:198-4 (1939); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. §26-2308 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWS c.
38, §5 (1938); VT. STAT. REV. §8045 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §6291 (26)
(1949). Some, however, remain silent as to the date from which calculated, or as
to the status of his sentence upon revocation of parole: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-
2803-2808 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. §439.190 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §637.06;
MISS. CODE ANN. §2543 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 94-9819 (1947); NEB.
REV. STAT. §29-2628 (1943); NEV. Comp. LAwS ANN. 11579 (Supp. 1949); N. D.
REv. CODE §12-5525 (1943); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 §298 (1930); S. C. CODE
ANN. §1038-11 (Supp. 1948) ; S. D. CODE §13.5307 (1939) ; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 781b §19 (1950); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §11-406 (1945).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. §6291 (26) (1949).
'Watts v. Skeen, 54 S. E. 2d 563, 566 (W. Va. 1949).
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sentence was to be determined as of the time of his release on parole.
"In the absence of statutory authorization," the court continued, "the
revocation of a parole does not operate as a forfeiture of any 'good time'
earned prior to the granting of the parole .... ,12 Others, in refusing
to forfeit the gain time, hold that statutes or rules providing for gain
time are to be read into the judgment and form a part thereof ;18 that
the '"dimunition of imprisonment provided for by statute is a privilege
of which the prisoner can be deprived only in accordance with the pro-
visions of the statute,"' 4 and if no provision is made for forfeiture upon
violation of parole, then the prisoner stands entitled to the time.'5 On
the other hand, courts have casually disallowed the gain time for good
conduct upon revocation of parole,' 6 or have held that the statutory
provisions allowing gain time for good conduct "cannot enter into the
sentence or form a part of it, for the reward must first be earned before
the prisoner is entitled to it."'' I The theory is that continued good
conduct is a condition precedent to the prisoner's rights to any credits,
and that the condition is not satisfied by misconduct on parole.
The relative dearth of decisions on this point in jurisdictions in the
third category would seem to be indicative at least of a policy to allow
a parolee to retain his gain time credits upon revocation of parole. An
overwhelming majority of the states do not have statutes expressly
dealing with the problem, and a majority of these states that have ruled
on the point have held that the prisoner stands entitled to the time upon
revocation of parole. Therefore, it would seem in line with the weight
of authority that in the absence of express statutory authorization there
should be no forfeiture of the credits upon revocation of parole.
In North Carolina the question has never been before the court.18
2lIbid.
Woodward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 1047 (1890). Indiana adopted
its present statute in 1897, hence subsequent to the above decision. See note 9
supra. Apparently, however, a parolee is still allowed to retain his gain time upon
revocation of parole. See Boyd v. Howard 224 Ind. 439, 68 N. E. 2d 652 (1946).
" State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 571, 100 N. W. 510, 512 (1904).
Iowa's present statute, IOwA CODE ANN. §247.28 (1950), is unusual in that it pro-
vides that one violating a condition of parole shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and shall be imprisoned to serve five years, upon the completion of the previous
sentence.
6 Ibid. See also Ex Parte McKenna, 79 Vt. 34, 64 Atl. 77 (1906).
'"Ex Parte Holton, 304 Mich. 534, 8 N. W. 2d 628 (1943)." Stephens v. Conley, 48 Mont. 352, 355, 138 Pac. 189, 192 (1914).
8 State v. Yates, 183 N. C. 753, 11 S. E. 337 (1927). The facts in this case
indicate that the order of revocation from the governor stated that "no time [shall
be] allowed for previous good behavior, if any such time was entered to his
credit." The point was not raised, the issue being the authority to revoke a parole
after the time fixed in the original sentence had expired. It is doubtful that any
gain time had been granted; he had been paroled after serving only 42 days. How-
ever, it has been held in other jurisdictions that a provision in an order of revoca-
tion for forfeiture of gain time for good conduct is illegal and outside the authority
of the governor. See State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N. W. 510
(1904). See also, Ex parte Ridley, 3 Okl. Cr. 350, 106 Pac. 549 (1910). Since
the Ridley case Oklahoma has amended its statute to provide for automatic cancella-
tion of gain time credits upon revocation of parole.
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While a prisoner in North Carolina may earn gain time credits for good
conduct,' 9 there is no express provision for forfeiture of this time except
by escape or attempted escape, 20 or participation in mutiny, riot, insur-
rection, destruction of state property, or attack upon any officer or
inmate.21 North Carolina, being in the third category, is therefore
similar to most jurisdictions in that the statute remains silent as to the
status of gain time credits upon revocation of parole.
It has been the administrative policy in North Carolina to allow an
ex-parolee to retain his acquired gain time credits, and this policy is
founded on the belief that the administrative agency is without authority,
under the present statutes, to deprive him of that time.22 In the light
of what has been said before, this view seems entirely proper from both
a legal and a policy standpoint.
ROGER B. HENDRIX.
Sales-Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness-Requirement of Privity
A wrongful death action was brought in North Carolina against a
retail druggist for breach of an implied warranty of wholesomeness of
a salt substitute, sold in its original package to plaintiff's intestate. The
defendant retailer joined his wholesaler as third-party defendant, on the
allegation that the wholesaler was primarily liable on the same implied
warranty. The wholesaler demurred for failure to state a cause of
action and for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The over-
ruling of the demurrer was affirmed and the joinder held proper be-
cause the retailer, if held liable, would be able to recover the loss from
the wholesaler. 1
Most jurisdictions recognize the implied warranty of fitness for
human consumption in the sale of food.2 A majority of jurisdictions,
" Rules and Regulations Governing the Management of Prisoners under the
Control of the State Highway and Public Works Commission. §2 (1949), as au-
thorized by N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-12, 13 (1943). Time earned is dependent on the
grade of the prisoner. Additional time may be earned if the prisoner is of a cer-
tain grade and on continuous good behavior for twelve months; credit may also
be earned for Sunday, holiday or emergency work.20 N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-41 (1943).
2 1Rules, op. cit. supra note 19, §6(o).
" Informal opinion, State Highway and Public Works Commission. But see
note 18 supra.
'-Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951).
Under the common law: Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53
P. 2d 878 (1936) ; Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100
S.W. 2d 336 (1936) ; Walker v. Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S. E. 2d 668 (1941) ;
Williams v. Elson, 218 N. C. 157, 10 S. E. 2d 668 (1940); Rabb v. Covington, 215
N. C. 572, 2 S. E. 2d 705 (1939) ; Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S. W. 2d 828 (1942) ; Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S. E.
94 (1936); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S. E. 2d 785
(1939) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES §242 (Rev. ed. 1948). The Uniform Sales Act has
been adopted in 34 states. See 1 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, SALES, p. XV, (1950),
Table III, for a list of the states which have adopted it, the dates of adoption, and
the respective state statutes. The implied warranty of fitness under the Uniform
